From: Reinventing History: The Enlightenment Origins of Ancient History eds. James Moore, Ian Macgregor Morris, Andrew J. Bayliss (London, 2008), pp. 115-136 ISBN: 978-1-905165-37-7 5. he Battle of Actium and the ‘slave of passion’* Carsten Hjort Lange In Antony and Cleopatra Shakespeare dramatically recalls Antonius’ (Mark Antony) wish to ight the battle of Actium against Octavian (later Augustus) at sea ‘For that he dares us to’t’. Domitius Ahenobarbus suggests that this might not be a good idea after all (3.7): Your ships are not well mann’d; Your mariners are muleters, reapers, people Ingross’d by swift impress; in Caesar’s leet Are those that often have ‘gainst Pompey fought: heir ships are yare; yours, heavy: no disgrace Shall fall you for refusing him at sea, Being prepared for land. In the end the battle at sea is lost, less because of the factors mentioned by Domitius Ahenobarbus, than because of the leeing of Cleopatra (3.10). his is then recalled in Domitius Ahenobarbus’ answer to Cleopatra, when she asks him who is to blame for the defeat at Actium (3.13): Antony only, that would make his will Lord of his reason. What though you led From that great face of war, whose several ranges Frighted each other? why should he follow? he itch of his afection should not then Have nick’d his captainship; at such a point, When half to half the world opposed, he being he meered question: ‘twas a shame no less han was his loss, to course your lying lags, And leave his navy gazing. * I am very grateful to Dr Andrew Bayliss, dr.phil Jacob Isager and Dr Ian Macgregor Morris for useful comments and suggestions. Furthermore, I would like to thank Dr James Moore and Dr Ian Macgregor Morris for the opportunity to participate in the colloquium ‘Making History. Writing the History of the Ancient World in the Long Eighteenth Century. A Colloquium at the Institute of Historical Research’. 1 he text used is that of the Oxford World Classics: Shakespeare (edited by M. Neill), he Tragedy of Anthony and Cleopatra (Oxford, 1994). 115 116 Reinventing History Shakespeare uses Plutarch superbly, to explain why, when Cleopatra abandoned the scene of battle, Antonius followed her, leaving his navy and army behind to fend for itself (Ant. 66, 68). Importantly, even though Cleopatra led, it was when Antonius followed her that the battle was lost. his Shakespearean view, due to the inluence of Plutarch, was also the most common view of the battle of Actium in the eighteenth century, the main focus of this article. he French historian Charles Rollin describes the scene from the point of view of the army of Antonius: ‘But seeing themselves abandoned by their generals, they surrendered to Caesar, who received them with open arms’. Plutarch and the majority of the ancient sources agree that Cleopatra betrayed Antonius by leeing and that he followed her, leaving his leet and army behind. Most eighteenth-century scholars follow Plutarch and the ancient evidence on this issue. Johannes Kromayer, a German military historian rejects this evidence, in a famous article from 1899, arguing instead that this was all in accordance with a prearranged plan, as mentioned by Cassius Dio, a Roman senator and historian writing in the early third century a.d. Yet as will be shown this idea, supported almost universally by modern scholars, does not it the ancient evidence. his article will focus mainly on what today might be described the alternative eighteenth-century view of the battle of Actium. Its purpose    C. Rollin, he Roman History from the Foundation of Rome to the Battle of Actium: By Mr. Rollin, vol. VI, eighteenth edition (London, 1841), 405. See Plutarch Ant. 68.3. J. Kromayer, ‘Kleine Forschungen zur Geschichte des Zweiten Triumvirats VII. Der Feldzug von Actium und der sogenannte Verrath der Cleopatra’, Hermes, 34 (1899). For the consensus, see Kromayer, Hermes 34, 33; T. Rice Holmes, he Architect of the Roman Empire (Oxford, 1928), 253–8, disagreeing with A. Ferrabino, ‘La battaglia d’Azio’, Rivista de Filologia e di Istruzione Classica, 52 (1924); G.W. Richardson, ‘Actium’, Journal of Roman Studies, 27 (1937), 158–9; J.M. Carter, he Battle of Actium. he Rise and Triumph of Augustus Caesar (London, 1970), 213; M. Grant, Cleopatra (London, 1972), 208, 211; J.R. Johnson, Augustan Propaganda: he Battle of Actium, Mark Antony’s Will, the Fasti Capitolini Consulares, and Early Imperial Historiography, Ph.D. diss. (University of California, 1976), 48–9, 55; H. Bengtson, Marcus Antonius. Triumvir und Herrscher des Orients (Munich, 1977), esp. 230; C.B.R. Pelling, ‘he Triumviral Period’, in A.K. Bowman et al. (eds.), CAH 10², he Augustan Empire, 43 B.C.–A.d. 69 (Cambridge, 1996), 57; D. Kienast, Augustus. Princeps und Monarch, second edition (Darmstadt, 1999), 7; K. Bringmann, Augustus (Darmstadt, 2007), 100; M. Reinhold, From Republic to Principate. An Historical Commentary of Cassius dio’s Roman History Books 49–52 (36–29 B.C.) (Atlanta, 1988), 104–5, with more scholarship. he Battle of Actium and the ‘slave of passion’ 117 is twofold: it will demonstrate that Kromayer’s ideas are already found in earlier scholars from the long eighteenth century and, importantly, there is an alternative that has wrongly been ignored for a long time. he alternative is the betrayal of Antonius by Cleopatra. In this article I will not go into great detail on the battle itself, but mainly concentrate on its historiography, although it will be suggested that Plutarch (especially Ant. 66, 68) is more credible than Cassius Dio. he battle of Actium was most likely decided by the Cleopatra’s treachery and the subsequent light of Antonius. Crevier and Actium: a Case Study Jean Baptiste Louis Crevier, a student of Rollin and for twenty years professor of rhetoric in the college of Beauvais, completed he Roman History From the Foundation of Rome to the Battle of Actium, the work of his former teacher. his section will look closely at Crevier’s description of the battle of Actium, as an example of the alternative eighteenthcentury view of the battle. he main evidence used by Crevier on the battle of Actium is Plutarch (Ant. 61–68). Crevier rightly stresses that this conlict was of such a magnitude that ‘the whole Roman Empire was shaken by this war’. He continues to give a detailed account of the troops and ships involved in the battle. He concludes: ‘By the account which I have given of the forces of the two parties, it appears that both generals had grounds to hope for victory’. He carries on to give an account of the preliminaries of war and rightly suggests that at this point in time Antonius was already in distress, due to desertions and famine amongst his troops. But importantly, in the judgement of Crevier Antonius could still hope to win. As a result of the problematic situation, Antonius summoned a grand council. Crevier explains: 5  7   Cleopatra’s betrayal has found some support in the twentieth century, but A. Domaszewski, Geschichte der Römischen Kaiser (Leipzig, 1909), 154–5; M. Beike, Kriegslotten und Seekriege der Antike (Berlin, 1990), 145 seem to be exceptions. J.B.L. Crevier, he Roman History From the Foundation of Rome to the Battle of Actium: hat is, To the End of the Commonwealth (By Mr. Crevier, Professor of Rhetorick in the College of Beauvais, being the Continuation of Mr. Rollin’s Work), vol. XVI, second edition (London, 1754). Crevier, Roman History, 35. Crevier, Roman History, 36. Crevier, Roman History, 42–5. 118 Reinventing History Dio assures us, that Cleopatra’s advice was to march back all the troops into Egypt, leaving only garrisons in the most considerable posts and towns in the countries they were to quit. A shameful and foolish advice, which I cannot believe even Cleopatra herself durst propose to Antony. Mean while this historian adds, that the Roman general consented to it, and that the battle of Actium, which followed soon after, happened in spite of Antony, when he had an intention to retire, and not to fight.0 Crevier interprets the ancient evidence on the battle of Actium, the same material modern scholars look at today. He continues: his account, of which I do not ind the least hint in any other author, appears to me very improbable, and I rather chuse to follow that of Plutarch, according to whom, the resolution of giving battle having been taken and conirmed, they only deliberated whether they ought to ight by land or sea. Crevier rightly stresses that Cassius Dio is the only source that mentions this alleged prearranged plan to lee Actium. As a result he concludes that the scenario mentioned by Plutarch is much more likely. Crevier suggests that Antonius had every reason to have conidence in his ‘battle-hardened’ legions, even when disease and famine are taken into account. his is fascinating and suggests, even though Crevier does not spell it out, that an oddity at Actium is the missing battle on land. He also mentions the suggestions by Antonius’ generals to send Cleopatra back and make for Macedonia. It should be remembered though that this would hardly have been possible without Antonius losing his leet. At the same time Crevier is right in stressing that the legions would most likely be lost if this prearranged plan would be carried out. his is deemed very unlikely by the eighteenth-century historian, as it does not it his understanding of Antonius and interpretation of the ancient evidence. He sums up the situation as follows: …; and that it would be very strange if Antony, who had such great experience in land-ights, did not take the advantage of the force, number, and courage of his legions, but on the contrary put his whole conidence in his leet. 10 11 1 1 1 Crevier, Roman History, 45. Crevier, Roman History, 45. Crevier, Roman History, 45. Crevier, Roman History, 45. Crevier, Roman History, 46. he Battle of Actium and the ‘slave of passion’ 11 Crevier has departed from the discussion of the prearranged plan; this is about the decision to ight at sea. He turns to his explanation of why Antonius decided to abandon the ight on land (at least at irst). Instead he focuses on the sea battle: Such solid reasons as these would doubtless have made an impression upon Antony, if he had still been capable of judging for himself; but he saw nothing but by Cleopatra’s eyes, not determined upon any thing but according to her directions. Crevier does not understand Antonius’ decision to ight at sea (Plutarch Ant. 63). Antonius’ plan was to try to win the battle of Actium, which most likely would involve a battle on land as well. He goes on to sum up the ship numbers and once again dwells on the question of why Antonius decided to ight a sea battle, quoting Plutarch (Ant. 64) and the centurion’s plea, trying to reason with his general not to ight an unRoman sea battle. Next Crevier describes the actual battle of Actium on 2nd September 31 b.c., where it was decided who should win supremacy over Rome. Antonius ofered battle, but this was refused by Octavian, who ordered his ships further away from shore, to give more room for manoeuvre. When ighting began Agrippa tried to sail around the ends of Antonius’ line and in doing so created chaos in the opposing line of ships. Crevier stresses that at this point during battle no side had the clear advantage. It was thus very much to the surprise of the ancient and modern writers/ historians that Cleopatra’s ships, at this exact point in time, hoist their sails and make of for Egypt. According to Crevier, fear was the likely reason for Cleopatra’s light: ‘without doubt fear had seized the princess’. He concludes in wonder: here was nothing very surprising in that behaviour of Cleopatra; but Antony’s conduct on this occasion is quite inconceivable. It is not possible, says Plutarch, to discover in it either the General, or the man of courage and conduct. He seemed even to have lost the power of following his own 15 16 17 18 1 Crevier, Roman History, 46. See D. Feeney, Caesar’s Calendar: Ancient Time and the Beginnings of History (Berkeley, 2007), 120–1 on the Roman idealisation of their land-based self-suicient pre-expansion days. he Romans were in the own view not very interested in the sea. Crevier, Roman History, 48. Crevier, Roman History, 49–51. Crevier, Roman History, 51. 10 Reinventing History inclinations, and veriied what is commonly said of lovers, viz. that their soul dwells entirely in the person whom they love.0 Cleopatra thus betrayed Antonius, but he, following her, betrayed his men and himself. he battle is lost and Crevier continues: ‘he number of dead did not exceed ive thousand; and the whole number of vessels which were taken amount to three hundred’. Plutarch is thus given the inal say, stressing that Octavian captured 300 ships in the battle of Actium (Ant. 61.1–2; 68.1) and that the number of dead enemies in the battle was no more than 5,000 dead (Ant. 68.2). For modern scholars Crevier’s lack of footnotes and secondary scholarship may seem strange at irst, but this should not be confused with unprofessional behaviour or lack of methodology; Crevier and his contemporaries knew the ancient evidence. Knowledge of this evidence thus makes it easy to follow Crevier’s line of enquiry. He, having interpreted the evidence on the battle of Actium, concludes that Plutarch is more likely than Cassius Dio, who is therefore rejected. here is nothing in the eighteenth-century practice, as exempliied here by Crevier, their use of evidence and the reading of sources, and the assumptions that underlies these practices, that are notably diferent from the methods of today. his is analytical historical research. It may thus be that we modern historians are too quick to dismiss certain sources, as this article will indeed suggest. Moreover one might ask if the professionalisation of history has prevented us from seeing the ‘emotional’ as a serious historical factor. he question is, of course, whether Crevier’s view on the battle of Actium is typical for the eighteenth century. he Standard Eighteenth-Century View on the Battle of Actium Rollin has Cleopatra suggest, following Plutarch (Ant. 63), that it would, if need be, be easier to escape by sea, which Antonius listens to, at the same time ignoring his oicers. hey advise him not to ight a sea battle and to send Cleopatra home to Egypt. Rollin reaches his conclusion after a thorough investigation of the context of the period of the triumvirate. He continues: he contest was doubtful for some time, and seemed as much in favour of Antony as Caesar [i.e. Octavian], till the retreat of Cleopatra. hat queen, 0 1  Crevier, Roman History, 51. Crevier, Roman History, 52. Rollin, Roman History, 403–4. he Battle of Actium and the ‘slave of passion’ 11 frightened with the noise of the battle, in which every thing was terrible to a woman, took to light when she was in no danger, and drew after her the whole Egyptian squadron … Antony, who saw her ly, forgetting even himself, till then, had had exceedingly well disputed. It, however, cost the victor extremely dear. For Antony’s ships fought so well after his departure, that, though the battle began before noon, it was not over when night came on; So that Caesar’s troops were obliged to pass it on board their ships. In England the ghost writer of Nathaniel Hooke, perhaps Dr Gilbert Stuart, a noted historian and reviewer, has similar views. Hooke died in 1763 and the ifth edition 1770 of his work he Roman History. From the Building of Rome, to the Ruin of the Commonwealth. Illustrated with maps and other plates is the irst to comprise all four volumes, thus for the irst time including volume IV with comments on Actium. Just like Crevier Hooke/Stuart interprets closely the preliminaries before addressing the actual battle of Actium; again, this is analytical historical research. Agrippa’s raids, and the desertions are mentioned and he then carries on describing the grand council: …, but Cleopatra biased him the other way, and obliged him, against his will, to hazard his empire and life in a sea-ight, and this only that, in case of a defeat, she might escape with greater ease. Dio pretends that she even advised him to march back to Egypt. Hooke/Stuart dismisses Cassius Dio as unlikely and instead prefers the account of Plutarch. In a footnote the diferences between a defeat on land and on sea are explained: Octavian perhaps had better chances in a sea battle, but the same would have been was the case on land according to Hooke/Stuart. But in case of a defeat on land Antonius would have found it diicult to escape, whereas in a sea ight an escape   5 6 7 Rollin, Roman History, 404. I would like to thank Dr Gareth Sampson for his helpful comments on Hooke. See also G. Sampson, I. Macgregor Morris and J. Moore, ‘Nathaniel Hooke’, in E.J. Jenkins (ed.), Eighteenth-Century British Historians (he Dictionary of Literary Biography vol. 336) (New York, 2007), 188–92. he publishers wanted to give the impression that the ghost writer used Hooke’s notes, but there is no solid evidence to back this up. N. Hooke, he Roman History. From the Building of Rome, to the Ruin of the Commonwealth. Illustrated with maps and other plates, ifth edition (London, 1770), 430. He also stresses that the decision to ight at sea rested on the idea that it would be easier to escape should they fare badly in battle (1770, 426–31 on the period covered in this article). Hooke, Roman History, 427. Hooke, Roman History, 428. 1 Reinventing History was possible. his may be wrong after all, but the historian is trying to make sense of the material in front of him (see below). Importantly, Antonius’ ‘limited’ chances for victory do not make the historian accept the prearranged plan to lee. Again, the tale of the centurion’s plea is mentioned (Plutarch Ant.64), followed by the actual ighting. Hooke/ Stuart concludes: …, when Cleopatra, wearied with expectations and overcome with fear, unexpectedly tacked about, and led towards Peleponnesus with her sixty sail: And, what is still more surprising, Antony himself, now regardless of his honour, led precipitately after, and abandoned his men who generously exposed their lives for his interest. Having reached Cleopatra’s galley, he went into it, and sat a long time in a melancholy posture, without desiring to se the Queen, though he had followed her, says Plutarch, without any apparent reason but the thoughts of her absence.0 Montesquieu expresses a similar view: he battle of Actium was fought, Cleopatra led, and drew Antony after her. It evidently appeared by the circumstances of her future conduct, that she afterwards betrayed him; perhaps that incomprehensible spirit of coquetry so dominant in her sex, tempted her to practice all her arts to lay a third sovereign of the world at her feet. A woman, to whom Antony had sacriiced the whole world, betrayed him. Even Oliver Goldsmith, in a book for schools and colleges and with no original research or interpretation, agrees, showing that in the case of Actium the diference between the scholars and the popular historians was virtually non-existent: But all of a sudden, Cleopatra determined the fortune of the day. She was seen lying from the engagement, attended by sixty sail; struck, perhaps, with the terrors natural to her sex: but what increased the general amazement, was, to behold Antony himself following soon after, and leaving his leet at the mercy of the conquerors. 8  0 1  Hooke, Roman History, 428 n. i. Hooke, Roman History, 429–31. Hooke, Roman History, 430. C.-L. de Secondat Baron de Montesquieu, Relexions On the Causes of he Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire (London, 1759), 183. O. Goldsmith, The Roman History from the Foundation of the City of Rome, to the destruction of the Western Empire, vol. II, sixth edition (London, 1789), 78f. he Battle of Actium and the ‘slave of passion’ 1 he comments on the gender of Cleopatra are typical of the period but should not make us dismiss the theory of betrayal in general. All in all these views are very close to one found in Crevier and in fact the theory of Cleopatra’s betrayal does seem to have been completely dominant until the end of the long eighteenth century (see below). Whether ‘proper’ historians or epitomising historians, they all seem to agree on this particular issue. Even Romantic poets followed these themes developed by historians. his is an interesting feature, showing that the work of these historians were having a genuine impact in forming popular opinion about the battle, and that the poets were responding to the themes they raise; this is very much in tune with the thought of the time. Waller Rodwell Wright, the consulgeneral of the Ionian Islands during their period as a British protectorate during the early years of the nineteenth century, tells the story of love, the greatest of stories, in his Horae Ionicae. But whither strays my thought? his classic shore Recalls the strain to themes of ancient lore. Behold you ruins, sacred to the brave hat trumph’d on Ambracia’s blood-strain’d wave! here spreads the op’ning bay in prospect wide, And Arta’s gulph receives the rushing tide – Arta, whose waves beheld the fated hour hat tore from Anthony the wreath of pow’r – Where Actium proudly rears her trophied head,   5 Similar T. Blackwell, Memoirs of the Court of Augustus. Continued, and Completed, from the Original Papers of the Late homas Blackwell, … by John Mills, Esq., vol. III (London, 1763), 176; Hooke, Roman History, 427–8. It is amongst others found in A. Adams, Classical Biography: Exhibiting Alphabetically the Proper Names, with a short Account of the Several deities, Heroes, and other Persons (Edinburgh, 1800), 284; J. Adams, he Flowers of Ancient History. Comprehending, on a New Plan, the most Remarkable and Interesting Events, as well as Characters, of Antiquity, third edition (London, 1796), 245; J. Aikin, General Biography; or Lives, Critical and Historical, of the most Eminent Persons of all Ages, Conditions, and Professions, Arranged according to Alphabetical Order. Chiely Composed by John Aikin, M.d. and the late Rev. William Enield, LL.d., vol. I (London, 1799), 315; L.-P. Anquetil, A Summary of Universal History; in Nine Volumes. Exhibiting the Rise, decline, and Revolutions of the diferent Nations of the World, from the Creation to the Present Time, vol. III (London, 1800), 444; E. Edward Button, Rudiments of Ancient History, Sacred and Prophane … By Way of Question and Answer. designed for the use of Schools, third edition (London, 1757), 359f; C.J.A. Hereford, he History of Rome, from the Foundation of the City by Romulus, to the death of Marcus Antonius. In hree Volumes. By the Author of he History of France …, vol. II (London, 1792), 467, R. Millar, he Whole Works of the Reverend Robert Millar … In Eight Volumes, vol. IV (Paisley, 1789), 328f. W.R. Wright, Horae Ionicae. A Poem, descriptive of the Ionian Islands, and Part of the Adjacent Coast of Greece (London, 1809), 27–8. 1 Reinventing History Octavius triumph’d, and his rival led. He who, unmov’d, the work of death had view’d, With eager haste his trembling love pursu’d; Resign’d the glorious prize for which he strove; For empire fought, and was subdu’d by love. Now, through the limits of the spacious plain hat parts her waters from th’ Ionian main, Nicopolis, majestic in decay, Records the triumphs of that fatal day. Irwin Eyles in his elegy on the occasion of the victory of Admiral Nelson at the Nile writes similarly on this story of passion: From Actium thus, the slave of passion led, For Beauty’s smile, his life and fame to wave, hus, to his former glories, Pompey dead, In Egypt found a dagger and a grave! Lord Byron, the famous English poet, also tells this extraordinary story of love and passion in Stanzas Written in Passing the Ambracian Gulf: hrough cloudless skies, in silvery sheen, Full beams the moon on Actium’s coast: And on these waves for Egypt’s queen he ancient world was won and lost. And now upon the scene I look, he azure grave of many a Roman; Where stern Ambition once forsook His wavering crown to follow Woman. Florence! whom I will love as well As ever yet was said or sung, (Since Orpheus sang his spouse from Hell) Whilst thou art fair and I am young; Sweet Florence! those were pleasant times, When worlds were staked for ladies’ eyes: Had bards as many realms as rhymes, hy charms might raise new Antonies. 6 7 his idea in fact has a long history. Dante places Cleopatra in the Second Circle of Hell (Canto 5.63) of he divine Comedy, together with other lustful igures. She is thus placed ‘higher’ than the Seventh Circle, Second Circle, the place of igures who committed suicide. Her sin was that of lust. I. Eyles, Nilus; an Elegy. Occasioned by the Victory of Admiral Nelson over the French Fleet on August 1, 1798 (London, 1798), 9. he Battle of Actium and the ‘slave of passion’ 15 hough Fate forbids such things to be, Yet, by thine eyes and ringlets curl’d! I cannot lose a world for thee, But would not lose thee for a World. (November 14, 1809) It does not matter if Cleopatra’s betrayal or Antonius’ light is stressed by the poets, as this is basically the same story, taken from Plutarch. Importantly, the prearranged plan is not mentioned as an option. Historians and poets alike conclude that Antonius led the scene of battle, leaving his leet and army behind, out of love for Cleopatra. his is of course also the line famously taken by Shakespeare. Why has this been dismissed? It is because it is seen as too good a story, or perhaps because it is thought that feelings should not be part of the decisions of generals in war? Is it that unlikely that Antonius might have followed Cleopatra because he loved her, as indeed the ancient evidence suggests? Kromayer and the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries As mentioned there has been a general consensus on the central issue on the battle of Actium since Kromayer, which rejects the account given in the ancient evidence, according to which Cleopatra decided to lee and Antonius, much to the surprise of the ancient evidence, to follow her. Instead the modern consensus is that the withdrawal was in accordance with a prearranged plan.0 Even though this theory in its modern form dates back to Kromayer, he was in fact articulating what had already been suggested, most notably in the account of the Battle of Actium by Colonel William Martin Leake, an English topographer, in his Travels in Northern Greece. Even though today hardly any scholarship before Kromayer is taken into account, it seems wrong, certainly from a historiographical point of view, to leave out the likes of Leake, especially if the commemorations of Octavian after the battle are also considered. he ieldwork of Leake is surely unsurpassed. He ‘discovered’ Michalitsi when he visited the 8  0 1 he text used is that of Lord Byron (edited by J.J. McGann), Lord Byron, he Complete Poetic Works, 7 vols. (Oxford, 1980–1993). See also don Juan 4.25–32; Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage 2.397–402. Plutarch Ant. 66; Velleius 2.85.3; Propertius 2.16.39. See Kromayer, Hermes 34, 33f.; Rice Holmes, he Architect of the Roman Empire, 253 on this issue. W.M. Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. IV (London, 1835), 40. 16 Reinventing History area in 1805; or to be more precise, he was the irst modern scholar who understood that Michalitsi had to be the site of Octavian’s tent and thus the site of his Victory Monument. His evidence was Cassius Dio, whom he cites: he place where his own tent stood he surrounded with squared stones and adorned with captured beaks of ships, and built in it an ediice open to the sky, which he consecrated to Apollo. Similarly, in volume I of his Travels in Northern Greece, as part of his discourse on Nicopolis, Michalitsi is mentioned as the most likely site of Octavian’s tent before the Battle of Actium. he conclusion goes back to a thorough reading of ancient texts together with topographical knowledge and understanding. He did not ind the Victory Monument and never claimed to have done so. he monument was irst discovered in 1913 by Alexander Philadelpheus, but Leake did indeed ind the right place:    Cassius Dio 51.1.3; Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. IV, 40. See also W.M. Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. I (London, 1835), especially 180, 193f. For a detailed discussion of Leake’s methodology and as a topographer, see M. Wagstaf, ‘Colonel Leake and the Historical Geography of Greece’, this volume; V.M. Murray and P.M. Petsas, Octavian’s Campsite Memorial for the Actian War (Philadelphia, 1989), 12–14; I. Macgregor Morris, ‘Shrines of the Mighty. Rediscovering the Battleields of the Persian Wars’, in E. Bridges et al. (eds.), Cultural Responses to the Persian Wars: Antiquity in the hird Millennium (Oxford, 2007), 249–52; C.L. Witmore and T.V. Buttrey, ‘William Martin Leake: a Contemporary of P.O. Brøndsted in Greece and in London’, in B. Bundgaard Rasmussen et al. (eds.), Peter Oluf Brøndsted (1780–1842). A danish Classicist in his European Context. Acts of the Conference at he Royal danish Academy of Sciences and Letters (Copenhagen, 2008), esp. 15, 24. Leake also identiied the ruins near Preveza as Nicopolis. In the back of volume I of his Travels in Northern Greece there is a map of Nicopolis by T.L. Donaldson. Another visitor to Nicopolis was the Dane Peter Oluf Brøndsted, a contemporary of Leake, who against his will, at least at irst, was forced by Ali Pacha to conduct a one day excavation at Nicopolis in 1812. he excavations yielded two local coins, one from the time of Commodus and one from Caracalla. Brøndsted was given the Caracalla coin; Ali Pacha pocketed the other as the latest ‘augmentation of his treasury’. See J. Isager, Peter Oluf Brøndsted. Interviews with Ali Pacha of Joanina in the Autumn of 1812; with some Particulars of Epirus, and the Albanians of the Present day (Athens, 1999), 63–74, 74 on the excavations; J. Isager, ‘Visitors to Nicopolis in the Reigns of Augustus and Ali Pacha’, in K. Zachos (ed.), Nicopolis B. Proceedings of the Second International Nicopolis Symposium (11–15 September 2002), 2 vols. (Preveza, 2007), 34–9. Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. IV, 187 with map of the area. See Murray and Petsas, Octavian’s Campsite Memorial for the Actian War, 14 n. 14. he Battle of Actium and the ‘slave of passion’ 17 Such a view as Dio here describes, Augustus could not have obtained from the isthmus of Nicopolis, or from any spot in the immediate vicinity, except Mikhalitzi, from whence all the objects stated may be seen. he theory of the prearranged plan can thus be traced back at least to the end of the long eighteenth century. he unacknowledged source of the theory it seems is the historian John Gillies in 1807, supported by Leake in 1835. In the judgement of Gillies Antonius could not win the Battle of Actium. He writes: From these diiculties a battle only could extricate him. He continues: His best oicers exhorted him to avoid ighting by sea; but Cleopatra, on the contrary, recommended this measure. She was impatient, it seems, to return to Alexandria; and Antony knew no pleasure equal to that of compliance with her will. He determined to accompany Cleopatra by the readiest way into Egypt, and to ight the enemy if his passage was obstructed. In this design, his leet was equipped either for a battle or a voyage …. he ‘emotional’ is certainly seen as a serious historical factor, but Gillies prefers Cassius Dio and the prearranged plan to lee to the account of Plutarch. He continues: In this manner the combat raged for two hours, when Cleopatra, who had viewed it from behind the line, darted through the midst of the combatants, and with crowded sail made all haste to escape from the bay into the open seas … Antony, also, followed her, and though his 5 6 7 8 Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. I, 193–4. On the Victory Monument, becoming more and more central to and understanding of the early ideology of the regime of Octavian, see Murray and Petsas, Octavian’s Campsite Memorial for the Actian War. Since 1995 new excavations have been carried out by Zachos, with remarkable success. See K. Zachos, ‘Excavations at the Actian Tropaeum at Nikopolis. A preliminary report’, in J. Isager (ed.), Foundation and destruction. Nikopolis and Nortwestern Greece. he Archaeological Evidence for the City destructions, the Foundation of Nikopolis and the Synoecism (Aarhus, 2001), 29–39; K. Zachos, ‘he Tropaeum of the Sea-Battle of Actium at Nikopolis: Interim Report’, Journal of Roman Archaeology, 16 (2003), 65–92; Zachos, Nicopolis B. I would like to thank Dr Andrew Bayliss for bringing my attention to John Gillies’ comments on Actium. See J. Gillies, History of the World, From the Reign of Alexander to that of Augustus, Comprehending the Latter Ages of European Greece, and the History of the Greek Kingdoms in Asia and Africa, from their Foundation to their destruction, vol. III (Philadelphia, 1809), 466–8; Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. IV, 36. Gillies, History of the World, 466. Gillies, History of the World, 466. 18 Reinventing History departure was known from both sides, the battle still continued with emulation …. Given the prevailing eighteenth-century view, this suggests a high level of debate on the subject of Actium in the long eighteenth century and in the nineteenth century. he prearranged plan theory was only accepted after Kromayer and is now deemed the most likely scenario. hus the prevailing modern view of Actium actually originated in the long eighteenth century. Kromayer, in a brilliant piece of persuasive scholarship, argues that the position of Antonius had become hopeless and therefore he decided to make a breakout. In what might be described as a typically thorough German academic style, Kromayer dismisses the standard eighteenth-century view on the battle and efectively ends the nineteenth-century discussion on the matter (see below). With Kromayer Cleopatra’s betrayal became an unlikely and even unacceptable conclusion and the debate on the battle changed towards the consensus of today.0 Even though this is a fascinating theory, it must be remembered that this is only a theory. Surely a very good reason is needed if ancient evidence is dismissed and a modern theory, disagreeing with most of the ancient evidence, is accepted instead. As already mentioned Gillies and Leake advocated this theory in the long eighteenth century and Kromayer’s theory is in most details similar. Leake writes: By the advice of Cleopatra, it was resolved, that after having garrisoned strongly the most important places, she and Antony should return with remaining forces to Egypt: but that avoiding any appearance of a retreat, in order not to discourage their allies, the leet in moving should advance as if intent on battle. heir focus is on the statement by Cassius Dio 50.15.1, stressing that Cleopatra was implementing this prearranged plan, rather than betraying Antonius. According to this theory Antonius had in reality lost the battle before it was ever fought, but the account of Cassius Dio is largely rhetorical, and must be contrasted to the much fuller narrative  50 51 Gillies, History of the World, 467. For a case against Kromayer, supporting Cleopatra’s betrayal, see C.H. Lange, Res Publica Constituta: Actium, Apollo and the Accomplishment of the Triumviral Assignment, Ph.D. thesis (University of Nottingham, 2008), chapter 4. A revised version of my thesis will be published by Brill in 2009. Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. IV, 36. he Battle of Actium and the ‘slave of passion’ 1 of Plutarch, which includes much more factual detail. Importantly, aside from Cassius Dio’s narrative, arguing for a decision to withdraw at the council before battle, this prearranged plan is not mentioned in any other ancient evidence. he twentieth-century alternative view to the prearranged plan is found in William W. Tarn, using Horace Epode 9, suggesting that Antonius wanted to ight, but treachery of the leet forced him in the end to lee. he poem cannot be taken to support the theory of Tarn that the leet of Antonius deserted him; Epode 9 cannot be taken to resolve the matter and lines 19–20 can never be decoded for certain. Ronald Syme, building on Tarn’s 1931 article, reaches the conclusion that there was little ighting and few casualties at Actium. He famously called the Battle of Actium a ‘Shabby afair’. he idea in fact goes at least back to George Rawlinson, Syme’s predecessor as Camden Professor at Oxford: hese repeated defections reduced the triumvir to a state of despondency, and led him most unhappily to accept Cleopatra’s fatal counsels. Under pretence of giving battle to his adversary’s leet, Antony, on the morning of September 2, b.c. 31, put to sea with deliberate intention of deserting his land force and lying with Cleopatra to Egypt. Actium was not a battle in any proper sense of the term. 5 5 5 55 Kromayer, Hermes 34, 44 and 48; Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. IV, 36. According to W.W. Tarn, ‘he Battle of Actium’, Journal of Roman Studies, 21 (1931), 182; W.W. Tarn, ‘Actium: A Note’, Journal of Roman Sstudies, 28 (1938), 168 Horace is a primary source, whereas Livy, Velleius, Florus, Plutarch, Cassius Dio and Orosius are secondary. He concludes that it is better to rely on Horace because of Cassius Dio’s use of rhetoric (rightly criticising Kromayer and the prearranged plan). his seems to be a misconception of history, judging ancient evidence by modern historical standards and furthermore, all writers used rhetoric or literary techniques. See S.A. Oakley, A Commentary of Livy Books VI–X. vol. I: Introduction and Book VI (Oxford, 1997), 7–10. Tarn’s idea is refuted by J. Kromayer, ‘Actium. Ein Epilog’, Hermes 68 (1933), 363–4, suggesting that Plutarch’s source can be traced back to the battle and that Cassius Dio used Livy and the autobiography of Augustus. On Cassius Dio, see J.W. Rich, Cassius dio. he Augustan Settlement (Roman History 53–55.9) (Warminster, 1990). Tarn, Journal of Roman Studies, 21, 173; W.W. Tarn, ‘he Actium Campaign’, in S.A. Cook et al. (eds.), Cambridge Ancient History, 10: he Augustan Empire, 44 B.C.–A.d. 70 (Cambridge, 1934), 104–5; R. Syme, he Roman Revolution (Oxford, 1939 (1952)), 297. Ferrabino, Rivista de Filologia e di Istruzione Classica, 52 (1924), 470–1 was the irst to use Epode 9 and argue that one of Antonius’ generals refused to ight and returned to port. he treachery of Sosius decided the battle. Syme, he Roman Revolution, 297. See also Pelling, he Triumviral Period, 59, accepting Kromayer’s take on the battle, but describing the battle of Actium as a ‘lame afair’. G.A. Rawlinson, Manual of Ancient History. From the Earliest Times to the Fall of the Sassanian Empire (Oxford, 1880), 452. 10 Reinventing History Most scholars since Syme have accepted Kromayer’s conclusions over Tarn’s. he one important issue where the two combatants Kromayer and Tarn agree, is that the old theory that the battle was lost because of Cleopatra’s treachery can safely be dismissed, a point that has been accepted all too willingly by subsequent scholars. he Situation Before the Battle All the evidence suggests that Antonius did not choose Actium as the site for battle. At Rome it was claimed that Antonius and Cleopatra were planning to make war on the Roman state and to invade Italy and Rome. However, in reality there is hardly much truth in that, even though they were surely planning for war. In the end Octavian did not wait until spring, as Antonius probably thought he would. Antonius set up his winter quarters at Patrae, leaving his leet at Actium about 200 km away. Octavian arrived at Actium irst, taking Antonius completely by surprise, as Crevier stressed correctly.0 As part of the manoeuvres before battle Antonius made sure the sails were on board, something quite unusual in ancient times. Ancient sea battles were fought close to land and thus sails would not be needed, and while this could be interpreted as showing an intention to lee, it seems more likely that this was a simple matter of Antonius keeping his options open 56 57 58 5 60 61 See Murray and Petsas, Octavian’s Campsite Memorial for the Actian War, 132, n. 6. See Kromayer, Hermes 34, esp. 1, 33f; Kromayer, Hermes 68, 377–80; Tarn, Journal of Roman Studies, 21, 173 and esp. 196; Murray and Petsas, Octavian’s Campsite Memorial for the Actian War, 133 summing up the modern view that Cleopatra did not betray Antonius. Livy Per. 132; Velleius 2.82.4; Tacitus Ann. 3.18; Plutarch Ant. 56.1–2; 58.1–2; 60.2; 62; Pausanias 4.31; Cassius Dio 50.3.2; 50.9.2; 50.12–13; Florus 2.21.1–3. See Kromayer, Hermes 34, 9; V. Fadinger, die Begründung des Prinzipats. Quellenkritische und staatsrechtliche Untersuchungen zu Cassius dio und der Parallelüberlieferung (Berlin, 1969), 189–194; A.J. Woodman, Velleius Paterculus. he Caesarian and Augustan Narrative (2.41–93) (Cambridge, 1983), 212. Pelling, he Triumviral Period, 48 rightly stresses that the decision of Antonius to bring Cleopatra so close to Italy was a mistake from a political point of view. Cassius Dio 50.11–13. Kromayer, Hermes 34, 9. Crevier, Roman History, 39. See also E. Kraggerud, Horaz und Actium: Studien zu den politischen Epoden (Oslo, 1984), 70; Carter, he Battle of Actium. he Rise and Triumph of Augustus Caesar, 208 stresses that the plan of Octavian was to avoid battle until at full strength and then drive the enemy back and the leet, deprived of land support would have to lee. But why make a surprise attack and then wait? Pluarch Ant. 64 and Cassius Dio 50.31.2. See Kromayer, Hermes 34, 35; Pelling, he Triumviral Period, 58. he Battle of Actium and the ‘slave of passion’ 11 in case the battle did not go according to plan. Crevier rightly stresses this as an assurance. he riches of Antonius and Cleopatra were also on board (Cassius Dio 50.15.4) and Antonius even decided to burn part of his leet. According to Kromayer all these factors are enough for us to accept Cassius Dio 50.15.1 and the intention of Antonius and Cleopatra to lee. Kromayer thus asks, as mentioned above, why Antonius accepted a sea battle; he answers that the blockade of Agrippa made his choices limited. Again, he draws the same conclusion reached by Leake. According to Kromayer’s theory the raids and capture of Greek cities by Agrippa meant Antonius was efectively blockaded: the leet of Octavian was superior before Actium, with Agrippa capturing Methone, Patrae, Leucas and perhaps Corinth, which led to a blockade of the Ambracian Gulf and the leet of Antonius. According to Kromayer the capture of Leucas efectively completed the blockade. his also meant that Antonius’ supply routes were cut of. Prior to Kromayer, Crevier and Hooke/ Stuart also advocated the idea that Antonius lost Leucas, Patrae and Corinth, both suggesting that Antonius’ choices were limited. he ancient accounts all point to desertion, disease and hunger amongst Antonius’ troops. Ultimately, the attack on Methone gave Octavian 6 6 6 65 66 67 68 6 Tarn, Journal of Roman Studies, 21, 189; Johnson, Augustan Propaganda, 49. Crevier, Roman History, 47. his equals the ‘Plan B’ of Tarn, Journal of Roman Studies, 21, 188. Cassius Dio 50.15.4; Plutarch Ant. 64.1. See C.B.R. Pelling, Plutarch. Life of Antony (Cambridge, 1988), 276. See also Horace Odes 1.37. See Tarn, Journal of Roman Studies, 21, 183–184 and Tarn, he Actian Campaign, 105, implying that Octavian burned the ships after the victory, not Antonius. Tarn, Journal of Roman Studies, 21, 192 he calls the idea that Antonius burned ships ‘he silly perversion’. But this is contrary to all the evidence (Cassius Dio 50.15.4 and Plutarch Ant. 64.1). See also Richardson, Journal of Roman Studies, 27, 155–156; Pelling, Plutarch. Life of Antony, 276. Kromayer, Hermes 34, 9; Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. IV, 34. Kromayer, Hermes 34, 9–28. See also Richardson, Journal of Roman Studies, 27, 159; Johnson, Augustan Propaganda, 48; Reinhold, From Republic to Principate, 103. On Corinth, see Cassius Dio 50.13.5, who puts the capture of Corinth before Actium, Plutarch Ant. 67.7 after. he best account on the build up to the battle is still Kromayer’s article from 1899. According to Grant, Cleopatra, 205–207 losing Methone meant losing the war, as there would be a blockade of Actium. Against this theory of a blockade, see Lange, Res Publica Constituta, chapter 4. Velleius 2.84.1, Cassius Dio 50.13.5–6, 14.4; Florus 2.21.4. See Woodman, Velleius Pateculus, 221–222. See also Kromayer, Hermes 34, 19–20, 25–26; Reinhold, From Republic to Principate, 103. Oros. 6.19.6 on Agrippa’s interception of supply ships. Crevier, Roman History, 38–42; Hooke, Roman History, 427. Orosius 6.19.5f, Velleius 2.84.1, Cassius Dio 50.11–15, 50.27.8 and Plutarch Ant. 63, 68.4. On the desertions, see Woodman, Velleius Pateculus, 222 with a list. Rawlinson, A Manual of Ancient History, 452 observes that this decided the engagement. 1 Reinventing History the possibility to cross to Corcyra (Corfu) and then Actium.0 But did this mean that Antonius did not have a chance of winning? And, more importantly, did he accept that this was the case? And why did he not use his land army? According to Crevier they were spectators, but surely they were there for a reason. heodor Mommsen, a leading ancient historian of the nineteenth century, is certainly right in stressing that it is most likely that Antonius’ legions were present at Actium to be used in a land battle. Of course some of them were ighting at sea, but they could easily have been deployed on land after an unsuccessful sea battle. Surely both generals had grounds to hope for victory. Vitally, while the eighteenth-century scholars accepted that Antonius choices were limited, they were still surprised that a Roman general did not stand and ight. he Battle of Actium: Cassius Dio versus Plutarch According to Cassius Dio the council before the battle saw Cleopatra suggest that they should lee and ight another day, as the battle was lost before it had been fought. his is, as mentioned, supported by the likes of Leake and Kromayer, but perhaps the most extreme example of supporting this idea is found in Josiah Osgood, who very recently concluded that in some ways Antonius had the better of the day, outwitting Octavian by escaping from Actium. his is a very odd approach, as it does not take the consequences of Antonius’ actions into account. he battle cannot be isolated from the war, which ended on 1 August 30 b.c. at Alexandria. By escaping Antonius only postponed what his light made inevitable. Furthermore, Cassius Dio contradicts himself at 50.33.1–2, apart from being isolated amongst the ancient evidence. Cassius Dio 50.33.1–2 is very close to the information in the rest of the ancient evidence, as it 70 71 7 7 7 Richardson, Journal of Roman Studies, 27, 156 n. 15; J. Osgood, Caesar’s Legacy. Civil War and the Emergence of the Roman Empire (Cambridge, 2006), 372. Crevier, Roman History, 48. T. Mommsen, Römisches Kaisergeschichte. Nach den Vorlesungs-Mitschriften von Sebastian und Paul Hensel 1882/86, Herausgegeben von Alexander demandt (Munich, 1992), 85. Crevier, Roman History, 36. Osgood, Caesar’s Legacy, 374. See also Kromayer, Hermes 34, 44 and 48; Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. IV, 36; F. Cairns, ‘Horace Epode 9: Some New Interpretations’, Illinois Classical Studies, 8.1 (1983), 91, stressing that Antonius was not technically defeated. Pelling, he Triumviral Period, 59 stresses that ‘Cleopatra arguably won it’, because they achieved all they could have hoped, thus supporting Cassius Dio and Kromayer. he Battle of Actium and the ‘slave of passion’ 1 focuses on Antonius and his disbelief when he learned that Cleopatra was leeing. According to Plutarch Cleopatra ran away at a time when the battle was yet to be decided; it is at this crucial point that Antonius chose Cleopatra above his men (Plutarch Ant. 66). here simply is no reliable method by which we can conclude that Cassius Dio 50.15.1 is the truth, i.e. what actually happened, whereas 50.33.1–2 is the ‘propaganda’ of Octavian, as some modern scholars do. It may indeed be that both stories are the ‘propaganda’ of the regime. he main problem when addressing the notion of Cleopatra’s betrayal is, as mentioned, that both sides of the modern twentieth-century debate, Kromayer and Tarn, agreed this never happened. he main evidence for Cleopatra’s betrayal is a Late Latin translation of Josephus (Against Apion) C. Apion. 2.59, a Jewish historian from the irst century a.d.: Sed quid oportet amplius dici, cum illum ipsum in nauali certamine relinquens, id est maritum et parentem communium iliorum, tradere eum exercitum et principatum et se sequi coegit? But what more need be said, when she, deserting even him – her husband and the father of their children – in the naval battle, compelled him to surrender his army and imperial title to follow her? Relinquens is perhaps better translated as ‘leaving’ not ‘deserting’, but there surely is no prearranged plan in Josephus. Similarly, Virgil (Aen. 8.704f), the Augustan poet, mentions that Actian Apollo ires the irst shot of the battle and as a result Cleopatra lees (Aen. 707–8): ipsa videbatur ventis regina vocatis vela dare et laxos iam iamque immittere funis. he queen herself was seen to woo the winds, spread sail, and now, even now, ling loose the slackened sheets. Velleius, an early irst-century Roman historian, agrees and stresses that Cleopatra took the initiative in the light and that Antonius chose her above his soldiers (2.85.3). In fact this is also found in Plutarch (Ant. 75 76 77 78 See Reinhold, From Republic to Principate, 114. See especially Kromayer, Hermes 34; Tarn, Journal of Roman Studies, 21, 196; Grant, Cleopatra, 213; Murray and Petsas, Octavian’s Campsite Memorial for the Actian War, 133 ignores the evidence, as there is agreement on this matter in the modern debate. Translation by H.St.J. hackeray, Josephus, he Life Against Apion (Cambridge Mass. and London, 1926). Pelling, Plutarch. Life of Antony, 284 suggests that Cleopatra’s betrayal is mentioned irst by Josephus. his is hardly true. Translated by H.R. Fairclough, Virgil Aeneid 7–12, he Minor Poems (Cambridge Mass. and London, 1934). 1 Reinventing History 66.3), Florus (2.21.8–9), a Roman historian writing during the reign of Hadrian and Cassius Dio (50.33.2). he sources except Cassius Dio are all in agreement: Cleopatra ran away and Antonius followed her. As mentioned all the ancient evidence on the battle could be dismissed as propaganda of the regime, including Cassius Dio 50.15.1. But the only possibility we have is to work with historical probability and use the evidence at hand. All the evidence suggests that Cleopatra betrayed Antonius, with the exception of Cassius Dio, who contradicts himself. Nothing in the historical context dictates that Cleopatra’s betrayal is unlikely or indeed impossible. One possible explanation may be the attitude towards Plutarch in the eighteenth century versus the attitude in nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholarship. In the eighteenth century his reputation was high, but already during the early nineteenth century we witness Plutarch’s fall from grace. he problem with that theory is that Cassius Dio is normally not considered a good source either. Conclusion: Cleopatra’s Betrayal Even in the nineteenth century the idea of Cleopatra’s betrayal was not dismissed by all scholars; Leopold von Ranke, a very inluential German historian of the nineteenth century, suggests that Antonius was betrayed by Cleopatra and made after her when she led: Als Cleopatra Gefahr sah, warf sie sich mit ihrem Geschwader in die Flucht, mitten durch die kämpfer. Antonius, schwächer als seine Leidenschaft, eilte ihr nach und liess seine lotte in der hand der Feinde. When Cleopatra saw danger, she led together with her leet throwing herself through the middle of the combatants. Antonius, weaker than his passions, hurried after her and left his leet in the hand of the enemies. On the issue of the battle of Actium Ranke, one of the founding fathers of modern historical research in Germany of the nineteenth century, was a binding link between the eighteenth-century and the nineteenthcentury approach to the battle. It seems that the critical method of the nineteenth century did not necessarily create a diference in approach to the battle of Actium.0 7 80 L. von Ranke, Weltgeschichte, 2.2: die Römische Republik und Ihre Weltherrschaft (Leipzig, 1882), 387–8. Translation by Carsten Hjort Lange. M. Gelzer, ‘Caesar als Historiker’, in D. Rasmussen (ed.) Caesar (Darmstadt, 1967), 438f. sums up a standard nineteenth- and twentieth-century deinition of a historian, as a person with a university decree in history, but at the same time he rightly concludes that the critical method, although it goes back to Niebuhr and Ranke, at least in Germany, was also found during the Renaissance and especially during the Enlightenment. he Battle of Actium and the ‘slave of passion’ 15 Mommsen rightly observes that the sources are not positive towards Cleopatra. he prearranged plan is mentioned and then dismissed. He neither believes in treachery nor ‘petulant’ treachery; Cleopatra led because she thought it best for her and her leet. He suggests that she wanted to win the naval battle, something the Ptolemies traditionally mastered. In the end it was understandable for Cleopatra to lee, thus saving her leet, when things went wrong, but completely incomprehensible that Antonius followed her. Mommsen’s description of the battle, using mainly Plutarch’s conclusion (Ant. 66, 68), is closer to Crevier’s eighteenth-century views than Kromayer’s theory. Furthermore, it needs to be remembered that Cleopatra was ruler of Egypt, not just the lover of Antonius; this is Mommsen’s vital contribution to this discussion. According to Mommsen Cleopatra did not betray Antonius, but she did lee the battle without telling him irst. Perhaps she did not lee out of fear after all, but because she tried to save what was hers, at least for the time being. She was after all only a client ruler. Importantly, even Leake, accepting Cassius Dio and the prearranged plan, suggests that Antonius’ men were surprised and dismayed ‘On beholding this shameful light of their commander’. To accept the prearranged plan does not necessarily mean to dismiss the idea of betrayal altogether; in this case Antonius’ betrayal of his men. Why should historical probability dictate that Antonius thought it unlikely to win? Most likely he thought he could win, but being the good general he was, he had a ‘Plan B’. William Ledyard Rodgers, a Vice Admiral in the US Navy during the early twentieth century believes that Antonius did not merely try to escape, but instead: ‘Like every good commander, Antony was ready for the worst while hoping for the best’. his certainly its a Roman general better. However, Rodgers also suggests that Antonius’ plan was to escape with as many soldiers as possible, if he did not win. he problem is that he did not do so, but simply left his leet and army behind. It seems that Cleopatra and Antonius left the battle before it was decided, as stressed by Plutarch, the most thorough source on the battle, and thus the answer may lie somewhere else. It 81 8 8 8 Mommsen, Römisches Kaisergeschichte, 85–6. Similarly, V.E. Gardthausen, Augustus und seine Zeit (Leipzig, 1891/1896), 377–83, who accepts Cleopatra’s betrayal. Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, 38. W.L. Rodgers, Greek and Roman Naval Warfare. A Study of Strategy, Tactics, and Ship design from Salamis (480 B.C.) to Actium (31 B.C.) (Annapolis, 1937), 535. Rodgers, Greek and Roman Naval Warfare, 535. Similarly, Grant, Cleopatra, 211, suggesting that that was the plan, but in the end they were not able to achieve this. his is in principle possible, but not what the sources suggest. 16 Reinventing History is hardly an unlikely scenario that during battle, before it was decided, Cleopatra lost her nerve and led to Egypt, or alternatively, decided that the battle was lost and led. She did save her leet, at least for the time being, but this meant the battle of Actium was lost and Antonius was closer to losing the war altogether. In conclusion, the debate on the battle of Actium raged all through the nineteenth century, with both sides (the prearranged plan and Cleopatra’s betrayal) represented. If we consider the long eighteenth century, Gillies and Leake supported the prearranged plan of Cassius Dio, which seems to have been deemed unlikely by scholars writing before Gillies. his changed with Kromayer and the later modern consensus. Since Kromayer the theory of Cleopatra’s betrayal has been deemed unacceptable, but it is time to take a critical stance towards the theory of the prearranged plan. It is time to dismiss Cassius Dio and accept the prevailing picture presented in the ancient evidence. It is time to re-evaluate the battle of Actium and take into account the standard perception of the battle held in the eighteenth century, which rightly prefers Plutarch over Cassius Dio. Cleopatra wanted to ight at sea, which Antonius accepted. he battle itself was most likely decided because Cleopatra lost her nerve and led, leaving Antonius behind to decide what to do. his equals Cleopatra’s betrayal, even though she might have thought it best for Egypt to save her leet. Looking at the ancient evidence, irst and foremost Plutarch, this seems much more likely than the prearranged plan of Cassius Dio. Importantly, Cleopatra’s betrayal caused Antonius to betray his leet and army at Actium, thus in reality losing him the war against Octavian. It would thus seem that for Antonius at least nothing went according to plan at Actium. We can choose to stress the diferences between the eighteenth-century and modern historical writing, but we should not dismiss secondary material on the grounds that it is it is old. A careful reading of the likes of Crevier clearly demonstrates that the methodology and knowledge of ancient evidence has not changed signiicantly over time, although the ways historical scholarship is presented have. It is not diicult to follow Crevier’s line of enquiry, as he is very close to Plutarch’s description of the battle. Having interpreted the ancient evidence before him, Crevier concludes that Plutarch is more likely than Cassius Dio; that it is most likely that Cleopatra led the scene of battle, leaving Antonius behind. his was not according to a prearranged plan; this was betrayal of Antonius by Cleopatra. He then, out of love for her, betrayed his men, following Cleopatra and leaving them behind. he ancient evidence should not easily be dismissed and neither should the ‘emotional’ as a serious historical factor.